Systems of political campaign financing reflect weakness in the democratic system and perhaps require regulatory reform. In a true democracy, socioeconomic status should not determine ones’ ability to become a policymaker. However, it is widely recognized that running for any election requires exorbitant amounts of money. With individual donors and interest groups supplying significant proportions of electoral campaign funds, it raises concern around the influence of money on politics and presents the dilemma of upholding ethical and corruption-free electoral funding systems. Although there has been law stipulating the disclosure of expenditures, and limiting campaign donations, the efficacy of this legislation has been called into question as it has ultimately proved ineffective in providing transparency and failed to prevent wealthy interests from heavily influencing policy. Economic elites, corporations, and interest groups through campaign contributions are able to alter the behaviour of legislators and furthermore influence policy. Former public servant and diplomat, John Menadue, once famously quoted, "Corporate donations are a major threat to our political and democratic system, whether it be state governments fawning before property developers, the Prime Minister providing ethanol subsidies to a party donor, or the immigration minister using his visa clientele to tap into ethnic money.” His argument is closely supported by other political researchers who find that corporate donations have prevented outcomes that align with a public interest as political access continues to be put up for ‘sale’. This is as legislators have been proven to often vote in accordance with the interests of their financial contributors. When campaign financing was first introduced, it was considered well intentioned action to contribute; a political gift. However the boundaries between gifts and interested money blur as gifts intrinsically create reciprocities. French sociologist Mauss characterised gifting as an analogous form of social contract where the ‘objects are never completely separate from the men who exchange them.’ Using this ideology he theorised that although gifts appear to be voluntary, they are in reality constrained, as they generate implicit obligations, resulting in complex interpersonal social bonds. Following Mauss’ theory on gift exchange, and Malinowski's principles of give and take, anthropologists and sociologists have widely accepted gift giving as a method of maintaining enduring social relations. Therefore although campaign financing can be classified as political gifting, it cannot be viewed as merely altruistic as expected reciprocity present in the exchange likely masks hidden interests. This calls into question if and whether electoral campaign financing within legal parameters could constitute alternative methods of ‘legalised’ bribery or other forms of political corruption. In the NZ 1999 election alone, contestants reported raising over 10 million dollars. Alarmingly this figure pales in comparison to the US where during the 2020 election, presidential and congressional candidates spent a record total of almost 14 billion dollars. The cost to maintain a seat in the US senate alone during an election cycle was averaged out to around $14,351 per day. The problematic aspect of campaign financing is that only about 20% of contributions are derived from everyday civillians who generally give about $200 or less. The remainder of contributions are primarily funded by wealthy donors, corporations, and political action comittees (PACs). The mere presence of PACs within the political sphere has been a topic of contention even dating back to the 1996 election cycle when PACs affiliated with tobacco interests donated close to $3 million to congressional candidates, and spent around $80 million on lobbying members of Congress. During that same election cycle pharmaceutical PACs donated around $4 million towards candidates, with ‘Big Pharma’ later spending 110 million dollars on lobbying. These financial figures indicate that even in developed and enduring, ‘western’ democracies such as NZ or the US, roles in public decision and policymaking are exclusive to those who already hold wealth and influence. The cost to maintain a seat in the US senate alone serves as an indicative reminder that a candidate’s ability to garner and maintain a role in parliament heavily depends on their capacity to appeal to sponsors and lobbyists.
The cost to maintain a seat in the US senate alone during an election cycle was averaged out to around $14,351 per day. This alone serves as an indicative reminder that a candidate’s ability to garner and maintain a role in parliament heavily depends on their capacity to appeal to sponsors and lobbyists.
An example of how much influence one individual can hold is seen via the king of municipal rainmakers, Michael Bloomberg. Bloomberg, the 17th wealthiest person in the world at the time, spent $109 million of his own money to secure a third term in 2009 as New York Mayor. Although in NZ, there are election laws that stipulate statutory limitations for political spending by individuals, sponsors, and lobbyists, this has failed to prevent the ability of private funding to influence political discourse and election outcomes. Parties in NZ must only declare private donations which exceed $30,000 over a year. Anonymous donations of under $15,000 to political parties and under $1,500 to individual candidates are still permitted. These regulations around identity disclosure for large sum donations are an attempt to provide public exposure to donor-candidate relationships in the hopes that this will prevent any sense of obligation from elected representatives from being carried out as political payoff. Although this works in theory, blind trust funds and anonymous donations make for loopholes around having to comply with disclosure requirements. This lack of transparency means that it is almost impossible to track every donation made to each party and where they come from, making it increasingly difficult to maintain systems free from corruption. Furthermore, these systems enhance the already powerful via promoting other issues such as incumbency. Incumbents wield an advantage as they typically have had more public exposure and easier access to campaign financing and government resources, making it harder for new faces to receive opportunities within the parliamentary sphere. Reformists have brought up state-funded elections as a solution to eradicating the influence of money on political campaigns. In NZ, public funding provides the two main political parties with $2 million each [this is just enough to cover television advertisements]. Increasing public funding whilst also implementing more stringent regulations around private funding could reduce a candidate's overall dependence on donors and party elite to help to pay for their campaigns. So where would all this money be coming from? The simple answer (surprise: taxpayers) has been enough to turn critics sour. In reality, governments would rather increase taxes than prioritise spending, so how do we debate reform? Although the intent behind state funding is in order to aid and abet a healthy democracy, critics argue public funded elections are inherently anti-democratic. The argument stems from the fact that the government would be using the power of coercion to force people into financing certain campaigns and political parties that they do not support or align with. Should taxpayers have a larger say on where their money goes during a state funded election campaign? Is this ironic given that they don't have a say on where their tax is allocated anyway? Furthermore, how or more importantly, who would be determining how much financing each party gets whilst taking into account smaller and more independent political parties? Political analyst Dr. Bryce Edwards states, "By receiving state funding, parties are partially co-opted into the state, blurring the line between political parties as voluntary, representative structures and the state." Though uncomfortable and contentious, there is need for honest assessment of reform around systems of political campaign financing. Current systems of electoral funding present structural impediments in place that have prevented equal accessibility to roles in the parliamentary sphere. We must acknowledge the presence of corporate and interested money if we want to utilise a multidisciplinary approach towards regulatory reform. Even today in developed and enduring democracies, roles in public decision and policymaking are exclusive to those who already hold wealth and influence. Closing the fraught intersection between wealth and political opportunity is necessary if we want to eliminate the potential for tyranny and truly get closer to reaching our ‘utopian’ vision of democracy.
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